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Islamism, Identity and Memory: Turkey Under Erdogan 
 
The studies of Turkish politics and society have developed around the center vs. 
periphery debate, or state vs. society, and Kemalism vs. Islamism. The dominant paradigm in the 
period from the 1970s through the 1990s, more or less, has utilized the center vs. periphery 
approach to explain ideological conflicts in the country.
1
 Islam was treated as the identity and 
ideology of the periphery while Kemalism (i.e., the attempted project to create a secular nation-
state along the lines of European institutions and practices) was treated as the ideology of the 
center epitomizing the doctrine of the modernization. Due to Turkey’s lack of democratization 
and failed economic programs, many social scientists accused the Kemalism and its guardian, 
i.e., the military, as the key obstacle to democratization and economic development. A prevailing 
paradigm in the social science community suggested that when Turkey tears Kemalism apart, 
along with its institutions, especially the military, it will remove all obstacles clearing the way 
for democracy and establishing a classically liberal economic system. Because of this definition 
of Kemalism as a burden on the country’s potential economically and politically, liberals and 
Islamists have allied their forces against the Kemalist power-bloc (i.e., the military, secular 
judiciary, and state bureaucracy). In an age of neo-liberalism where everyone criticized 
ineffective bureaucracy as aggravated by its size and the flexing of state power, the AKP 
leveraged this critique for its own purposes to undermine the state institutions and build its own 
Islamist self-serving political structure, as predicated on Erdogan’s image as a savior of the 
nation.   
The marginalization of conservative masses fostered a narrative of victimhood, stoking 
the concerns of vengeful generation in Turkey. This broad sentiment is best expressed by Necip 
Fazil Kisakurek, Erdogan’s muse, as becoming “a pariah in one’s own homeland”.2 Islamism has 
been reconstructed as a populist ideology to empower society against the inefficient Kemalist 
bureaucracy. This populist form of Islamism has become a useful tool in Erdogan’s hands to 
portray disparagingly his opponents as alien, elitist, and the fifth column while claiming to 
represent the people and their indigenous values of Turkish society. Erdogan has succeeded in 
undermining the state institutions and especially the rule of law by establishing an authoritarian 
system through referenda.  
Thus, we argue that this recent form of Islamist populism has damaged Turkey’s 
relatively young democratic experiment and the evolution of a public sphere that cherishes 
constitutional rights of free expression and agency and this has to be scrutinized. In this regard, 
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on April 1, 2019, a group of Turkey experts came together to discuss the transformation of 
Turkey under Erdogan and organized a one-day workshop at The University of Utah. This 
special issue evolved out from that one-day intense workshop and focuses on three sets of 
questions; 
1) The Context: What are the major social, ideological, and political factors which have 
driven the transformation of the AKP?  How and in what direction have the objectives 
and strategies of the AKP changed and how does one explain the divergence between 
professed ideals and practices?  What have been the roles of external factors and 
powers in the transformation of the AKP?  
2) The July 15 Coup Attempt and Foreign Policy: What are the major repercussions 
of the coup attempt on key Turkish state institutions and policies? How has the coup 
affected Turkish foreign policy towards regional and international powers?   
3) Methodological Issues: How do we account for the current political crisis in Turkey 
and the government’s moves toward authoritarianism? What have we, as a scholarly 
community, missed in our earlier studies of the AK Party? Does it make sense to 
study Turkish politics as just a clash between Islam and secularism or as a more 
complex set of circumstances?  
 Many participants in the 2019 workshop signaled an unexpected affinity between 
Islamist populism and neoliberalism in the case of Turkey. Erdogan’s formulation of Islam has 
granted an essential ideology for neoliberalism to work and expand at the expense of the rule of 
law. Moreover, some participants insisted that Erdogan’s Islamism is calculated to conceal intra-
class conflict and engender false consciousness among the lover-middle classes. By utilizing 
Islam, Erdogan has created a new class configuration to hide corrupt practices, while providing 
charitable means to those in need, particularly those who identify as his most ardent supporters. 
The growing segment of the country’s new urban poor is contained via a web of religious 
foundations to transfer food and some public services. Islam, under Erdogan, has become a 
Foucauldian disciplinary power. Foucault wrote “We must cease once and for all to describe the 
effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it 
‘masks,’ it ‘conceals.’ In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of object 
and rituals of truth.”3 Erdogan’s Islamism represses, censors, masks and hides the government’s 
most blatant corrupt practices. Numerous participants raised the question about why scholars and 
observers failed to notice the direction Erdogan had taken in governing, especially as so many 
had celebrated him as a liberal Muslim politician seeking to fortify democracy in Turkey. This 
led to a spectrum of questions about Erdogan’s core beliefs, his intentions, and his change in 
governing strategy within the contexts of internal and external events.  
Transformation of Turkey under the AKP rule 
Undoubtedly, AKP governments collaborated with various segments of society in this 
project of transformation. For instance, academia and civil society elites, who are located mainly 
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in Istanbul and Ankara and had been under the control and influence of segments with 
historically liberal and leftist tendencies, supported and defended AKP’s policies at home and 
abroad.
4
 Apart from a few exceptions, some of which had assimilated themselves into the 
classical, central-right parties, nearly all Islamic cemaat—fraternal organisations—ultimately 
supported the AKP in its nascent period. Prominent among these organisations was the 
controversial Gülen Movement, which AKP elected officials had viewed akin to a civil society 
organisation. However, the Gülen Movement also had propagated around the world through its 
educational institutions while seeking to participate in the state mechanisms within Turkey, from 
a Sunni Islamic tradition. Although the Gülen Movement and the AKP, as is often asserted, 
emerged from discreet Islamic traditions to usurp Kemalist sovereignty in Turkey, they created a 
coalition unifying their interests without a clear name and changing Turkey’s previously 
inflexible bureaucratic order.
5
 (Yavuz 2018, Watmough & Öztürk 2018).  
But all this began to transform rapidly for various reasons: the advent of global 
illiberalization, the Arab Spring, an economic growth model removed from production and the 
Gezi Park protests. This set the stage for a wave of authoritarianism through which Erdoğan took 
control, out of fear of losing power. Turkey primarily changed the path it had set out on—touted 
as democracy, participation and liberalism—and moved towards a swift descent into 
authoritarianism.
6
 It opted to depart the coalition it had created with a portion of the Kurds and 
with the Gülen Movement and decided instead to engage in open conflict with these partners. 
While terrorizing these two groups, it moved to criminalize the opposition, using the judiciary 
and media organs that depended on the ruling government. It spoiled the peace process Turkey 
had developed with the Kurds
7
 and set the stage for a public battle with the Gülen Movement.  
The Gülen Movement’s response to this and the much-debated 15 July 2016 coup d’état 
attempt precipitated Erdoğan’s adoption of extraordinary powers under the guise of a victimized 
yet combative leader
8
. He declared himself president in a disputed referendum, modified the 
constitutional system and directed his administration towards an anti-Kurdish, anti-liberal and 
Eurasianist standard by setting up unnamed coalitions with the nationalist wing elements who 
were far removed from the Kemalist and Western notions Turkey had formerly allied with the 
Gülen Movement to incapacitate. This revealed a change that spilled out into the world, starting 
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domestically in its diaspora policy and overflowing into the general perception of Turkey with its 
foreign policy, systemic problems and the Kurdish question. Once the AKP had accomplished 
the initial phase of this project of transformation, it would continue to expand its impact while 
reaffirming Erdoğan’s tenure in power. This special issue is an effort to understand this dramatic 
period of transformation. 
Contributions of the special issue  
The first article is written by Paul Kubicek who directly engages with some of the key 
methodological questions involved in how the earlier record of scholarship treated the AKP in 
general and Erdogan in particular.  The earlier record accepted the story of the AKP on its 
political face value, treating it as an agent for democratization. Many international actors 
including the European Union and global media, such as The Economist and the New York 
Times, also supported the AKP as the essential agent of change and liberalization. As of 2020, 
Erdogan, however, has turned the AKP into his own party, operating like his personalized 
organization and he has become the most oppressive leader in Turkish history. Kubicek argues 
that neither he nor many scholars had expected this outcome from Erdogan. So, he examines 
why the scholarly community failed to anticipate this authoritarian outcome.  In addition to the 
EU membership process, which the AKP supported, many scholars argued that even though the 
AKP had evolved from the Islamist National Outlook Movement, the AKP moderated to position 
itself as the agent of democracy and political moderation. This article not only raises ethical and 
methodological issues but also offers a way for recontextualizing the origins and the evolution of 
the AKP.  
Secondly, Fumiko Sawae, a leading scholar of Turkish studies in Japan, offers a unique 
perspective by arguing that Erdogan’s transformation was not only his making but also his 
response to the expectations of his grassroots supporters. She offers a nuanced reading of this 
transformation by utilizing the extant literature on populism. She employs the concept of the 
“politics of belonging” to examine Erdogan’s new Islamic-nationalistic rhetoric. This brings up a 
painful acknowledgment of Turkey’s political culture, which appears to be conducive to 
authoritarianism in the name of belonging or the survivability of the state.  
Umut Uzer examines how the AKP leadership has narrated the Ottoman history to justify 
its domestic and foreign policy with the goal of restoring Turkey’s historical greatness. The 
founding fathers of the Republic had distanced themselves from the institutions, practices, and 
discourses of the Ottoman system and had sought to establish a secular nation-state by imitating 
the Western model. In the reforms of Mustafa Kemal, the Ottoman past became the “other” or 
“another country” to be freed. Islamists, such as Kısakürek and Erdogan, meanwhile, created a 
romanticized Ottoman past to challenge the Kemalist republic and undermine the westernizing 
reforms.
9
  By utilizing the ideas of Kısakürek (1904-1983), Erdogan’s ideological role model, the 
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AKP leadership has been redefining the nation as Islamo-Ottoman and the state as an entity to 
serve Islamic causes.  
Meanwhile, Adisonmez and Onursal provide a detailed reading of the ontological 
security of the state and how the state has been sacralized in Turkish political culture. They 
examine Erdogan’s successful leveraging of fear and deep insecurities among the Turkish 
population to mobilize the masses for the survival of the indivisible state and its sovereignty as 
the ultimate goal in Turkish politics. By examining the discourse on ontological (in)security, 
they analyze how Erdogan has used the high stakes political debate of the survival of state and 
unity of the nation to justify his authoritarian and kleptocratic practices.  
           The most important challenge Turkey has faced recently is how to accommodate its 
assertive Kurdish minority. The Kurdish question has become the existential issue for the 
Republic of Turkey. In this regard, Mehmet Gurses examines the evolving Kurdish question in 
Turkey with an emphasis on how it is interacting with changing domestic, regional, and global 
dynamics. He offers a comprehensive, potent argument about how Erdogan turned the Kurdish 
political movement into an “enemy of the Turkish state,” while using all available means to deny 
the basic political rights to the Kurds. He insists that the recognition of Kurdish identity claims 
might be the only way to free Turkey from this burden and its mortgages with the major powers.   
           Erdogan not only controls the population inside Turkey, but he also uses various strategies 
to control the Turkish diaspora and, wherever possible, manipulates these diaspora communities 
for his own narrow political goals. Erdogan has not assisted meaningfully to integrate these 
diaspora communities within their respective host countries. On the contrary, he has planted 
seeds of suspicion in host countries, which have placed the respective Turkish minority 
population at risk. Baser and Ozturk’s papers examine the ways in which Erdogan has 
manipulated the diverse Turkish diaspora communities in Europe. They argue that authoritarian 
states particularly employ diaspora governance as a mechanism to monitor and control diaspora 
groups, which home communities perceive as dissidents.   
The AKP governing administrations had effected considerable changes in Turkey’s 
foreign policy and diaspora relations, at least until 2011. It underwent a relatively active process 
by activating the concepts of soft power and diaspora diplomacy through transnational state 
apparatuses.
10
 In this regard, but with a different aspect, Kosebalaban analyzes the shift from a 
liberal-oriented foreign policy to a more nationalistic and security-oriented program. He argues 
that this break occurred amid the Syrian civil war and the failure of the Turkish state to cope with 
the crisis. Kosebalaban aptly argues that Turkey’s foreign policy goal of overthrowing Assad 
morphed into an objective of preventing gains among the Kurdish minority along the Turkish-
Syrian border.  
The final paper in this edition encompasses an analysis of the historical fears and 
memories of the Republic. The founding fathers not only tried to “otherize the Ottoman past” as 
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a “foreign land” but also worked hard to forget it. This sense of amnesia was necessary and 
justified to overcome the revanchist feelings and the emergence of vengeful nationalism in 
Anatolia. They insisted the essence to “invent a new Turkish identity as European,” not to 
“discover” Islamo-Ottoman-rooted identity. They justified the act of forgetting, in order to create 
a new identity. This paper indicates that mixing history with politics becomes problematic. The 
author concurs with David Rieff’s well-known book that “the commemoration of past wrongs 
can become a moral cudgel, cynically weaponized over and over again for political ends.”11 
Whenever foreign powers have difficulty with Turkey or their interests conflict with Turkish 
demands, they “misuse” the massacres of Armenians, characterizing them as genocide to shame 
Turkey. In 2019, when Turkey’s interests conflicted with the U.S. over the Syrian civil war and 
became more aggressive vis-à-vis the U.S. alliance with the Kurdish militias, both chambers of 
the U.S. Congress voted to recognize and remind Turkey that the events of 1915 constituted a 
“genocide.”  Turkey, in turn, reminded the U.S. that they are not in the position to lecture 
Turkey, given that American history is punctuated by ethnic cleansing against the native 
Americans, slavery and ongoing practices of racism against the country’s non-white population.   
No case involving Turkey has been more politicized than the events of 1915 because of 
their repeated misuse of the history as a tactical objective to shame Turkey. Yavuz’s paper 
summarizes the historiography, memory, and the Armenian attempts to sacralize the past as 
“genocide” in order to deflect alternative historically accurate interpretations of the events.  
Yavuz, by examining the Turkish and Armenian historiography, deals with the issue of memory, 
identity and the process of otherizing the “Turks” as a genocidal enemy. The article explores 
why Armenians have sought to engage international parliaments and courts to frame the events 
of 1915 as genocide. The process of “genocidizing” the events also is the outcome of Armenian 
attempts not to face their own history of revolutionary committees and their destructive impacts.  
After examining these competing historiographies, Yavuz offers a way for how both sides can 
come together by humanizing the mutual suffering of each group and developing a shared 
language that encompasses the comprehensive impact of the events of 1915. 
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